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INTRODUCTION
Legislative attention to violence on television began in the
1950s.' The Senate Subcommittee on Juvenile Delinquency of the
Committee on the Judiciary under Senators Kefauver and, later,
Dodd conducted investigations into this area in 1954, 1955, 1961-
62, and 1964.2 In 1969 the National Commission on the Causes
and Prevention of Violence, chaired by Dr. Milton Eisenhower,
reported that "a constant diet of violent behavior on television has
an adverse effect on human character and attitudes."3 The
Commission's study, however, was based on a small number of
lab studies, and little action took place on the subject until 1972,
when the Surgeon General issued a report concluding that
television violence has an adverse effect on certain members of
society.4
These early studies represent the beginning of a long
continuum of research on violence on television and its effect on
society, especially children. On December 1, 1990, President
George Bush signed the Television Violence Act5 into law. This
Act, originally introduced in 1986 by Senator Paul Simon (D-Ill.),
is designed to encourage the networks, the cable industry, and
independent stations to reduce the amount of violence currently
shown on television. The Act, according to Senator Simon, is not
1. Violence on Television, 6 COLuM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 303, 303 (1970).
2. Report on the Brdcst. of Violent, Indecent, & Obscene Material, Report, 51
F.C.C.2d 418 (1975).
3. Id. para. 1; see also Media Violence: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Juvenile
Justice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1984)
[hereinafter Media Violence].
4. Surgeon General's Report by the Scientific Advisory Comm. on Television and
Social Behavior: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm.
on Commerce, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 25-26 (1972); see also Thomas G. Krattenmaker &
L.A. Powe, Jr., Televised Violence: First Amendment Principles and Social Science
Theory, 64 VA. L. REV. 1123, 1128 (1978).
5. Television Program Improvement Act of 1990, 47 U.S.C. § 303c (Supp. III
1991).
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direct government regulation of television content. It "simply
permits the industry to establish standards on violence on a
voluntary basis for limited purposes and a limited time. Nothing
more. Nothing less." 6
This Note. examines the Television Violence Act. Part I
discusses federal attempts to improve children's television
including the 1974 Family Viewing Policy, a voluntarily imposed
guideline found unconstitutional in 1976; the Television Violence
Act; and the Children's Television Act of 1990. Part II discusses
the relationship between violence on television and the behavior
of certain segments of the population, including a discussion of
various social science theories that purport to establish this
relationship. A brief analysis of these theories establishes the
difficulty in demonstrating a causal connection between violence
on television and an individual's behavior. Part III provides a
detailed analysis of the Television Violence Act, including the
Act's problems, effectiveness, and constitutional implications.
This Note concludes that, while the Act raises distinct First
Amendment questions, it is constitutional. Irrespective of its
constitutionality, however, the Act is unlikely to reduce violence
on television enough to satisfy those in government who contend
that violent television is a significant contributor to a violent
society.
This Note, therefore, concludes with a discussion of alterna-
tives to the Act for reducing television violence. Many of the
proposed alternatives would be either unconstitutional or ineffec-
tive in accomplishing Congress's objective of decreasing the
amount of violence in society by reducing it on television.
Because the Television Violence Act is unlikely to change
television content in any significant way, and because the
proposed alternatives are either unconstitutional or unrelated to
Congress's objectives, this Note recommends leaving regulation of
violence on television to the market and allowing the public to
show its approval or distaste for violent television by what
6. Paul Simon, A Way to Curb Violence on TV WASH. POST, July 15, 1989, at A20
(letter to the editor).
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programming it watches and what advertisers it supports. While
the marketplace is not universally effective in inducing social
change, it is far better than allowing the government to impose its
values upon society by regulating the content of speech.
I. CONGRESSIONAL ATTEMPTS TO ENACT CHILDREN'S
TELEVISION LEGISLATION
Concern over violent programming on television began to
intensify in the early 1950s, when studies on the extent of
television violence were first conducted.7 In response to these
studies and because of its concern for children, the National
Association of Broadcasters (NAB) developed a code that
recognized broadcasters' responsibilities to present certain themes
with greater sensitivity and with regard to their potential effects on
children.8 The National Association of Broadcasters Television
Code required broadcasters to present violence and sex without
unnecessary emphasis and only as required by the plot develop-
ment.9
After the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention
of Violence released its report in 19690 and the Surgeon General
released his study in 1972,11 Congress began to take action. In
1974 both the House and the Senate Committees on Appropria-
tions directed the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or
Commission) to submit a report to the Committees outlining
specific actions planned by the Commission to protect children
from excessive programming of violence and obscenity.'2 In
response, Richard Wiley, then Chairman of the FCC, attempted to
7. Violence on Television, supra note 1, at 303.
8. In re Primary Jurisdiction Referral of Claims Against Gov't Defendant Arising
from the Inclusion in the NAB TV Code of the "Family Viewing Policy," Report, 95
F.C.C.2d 700, 702 (1983) [hereinafter NAB Report].
9. See Note, The Regulation of Television Violence, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1291, 1313
(1974).
10. Media Violence, supra note 3, at 22.
11. Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 4, at 1127.
12. ld. at 1129. In 1974 the FCC received 32,435 complaints about violent or
sexually oriented programming. L.A. Powe, Jr., Cable and Obscenity, 24 CATH. U. L.
REv. 719, 732 (1975).
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get the three networks (ABC, NBC, and CBS) to adopt a policy
of self-regulation that would decrease the amount of sex and
violence on television. 3 Consequently, during the winter of 1974,
the networks and the NAB Television Code Review Board adopted
the Family Viewing Policy. The policy stated that programs
broadcast during the first hour of prime time would be suitable for
viewing by the entire family unless the network broadcast
advisories warning parents that some of the materials might not be
suitable for viewing by younger family members. 14
Although the policy called for voluntary enforcement, the
amount of violence aired on television did not change for three
reasons. First, the broadcast industry is motivated by a desire for
profits, and violence sells.15 Second, in order to maximize its
profits, television airs programs of mass appeal, and violent
programs further this appeal.'6 Finally, violence is considered a
key element of success for such programming. Therefore, the
broadcast industry has little incentive to implement voluntarily any
restrictions on violence.
17
In response to the networks' failure to reduce violence on
television, the Subcommittee on Communications of the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce held hearings on
television violence.18 The Subcommittee issued a report contain-
ing five conclusions. 19 First, it stated that while it may be
impossible to "prove" a cause and effect relationship between
television violence and aggressive behavior, excessive viewing of
13. Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 4, at 1129.
14. Id.
15. The Regulation of Televised Violence, supra note 9, at 1313.
16. Id.
17. Id. In November 1976, a federal district judge found the Family Viewing Policy
unconstitutional and unenforceable because broadcasters had come together in violation
of antitrust legislation. Writers Guild of Am., West v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064 (C.D.
Cal. 1976), vacated sub nom., Writers Guild of Am., West v. American Brdcst. Co., 609
F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980).
18. SUBCOMM. ON COMMUNICATIONS OF THE HOUSE CoMM. ON INTERSTATE AND
FOREIGN COMMERCE, 95TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT ON VIOLENCE ON TELEVISION 1
(Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter VIOLENCE ON TELEVISION].
19. James A. Albert, Constitutional Regulation of Televised Violence, 64 VA. L.
REV. 1299, 1311 (1978).
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violence may have harmful effects.2" Second, the responsibility
for the present level of violence rests largely with the networks
and, to a lesser degree, with broadcast licensees, program
producers, advertisers, and the viewing public.21 Third, parental
supervision is probably the most effective way to curb the
negative effects of excessive viewing of television violenceby
children.22 Fourth, industry self-regulation is a potentially effec-
tive way to limit television violence.23 Finally, there are avenues
through which the Subcommittee, the FCC, and the public can
address the problem of television violence in a manner consistent
with the First Amendment.24 Congress took no action regarding
this report because of the belief that the First Amendment and
Section 326 of the Communications Act of 193425 prevented any
type of governmental intrusion into the programming decisions of
the broadcasting industry.26
In 1982, ten years after the Surgeon General's first report on
the effects of television violence, 7 the Surgeon General issued
an updated report. The Surgeon General's new report stated that
the great majority of observational or field studies and surveys
indicate that there is a positive correlation between television
viewing and a variety of behavioral influences including aggres-
sive behaviors.28 Congress and the Reagan administration largely
ignored this report. In 1983, the NAB Code was eliminated.29 In
1984, the FCC, as part of its efforts to deregulate the broadcast
industry, discarded the Commission's rules curbing advertising
time and separating commercials from programs on children's
20. VIOLENcE ON TELEVISION, supra note 18, at 4 (majority report).
21. Id. at 7.
22. Id. at 10.
23. Id. at 11.
24. Id. at 13.
25. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1988).
26. Albert, supra note 19, at 1315-16.
27. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
28. Media Violence, supra note 3, at 19.
29. NAB Report, supra note 8, at 704 n.15.
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television.3" After these actions, there was little legislation
concerning children's television until the Television Violence Act.
A. Overview of the Television Violence Act
Senator Paul Simon introduced the Television Violence Act.
Senator Simon reported first becoming interested in reducing the
amount of violence on television when late one night he turned on
the television and watched someone "being sawed in half by a
chain saw." He wondered what happens when children see such
programs.31 Senator Simon then asked representatives of the
television industry about the issue. The television industry
informed Senator Simon that an NBC study showed that there
might not be any relationship between violence on television and
violence in society.32 These representatives also told Senator
Simon that they could not get together and agree on voluntary
standards because it would violate the antitrust laws.33 Conse-
quently, Senator Simon introduced the first of a series of bills that
would exempt the networks from the Sherman Antitrust Act34 if
they would reduce the amount of violence on television.
30. Michael J. Palumbo, Broadcast Regulation, Has the Marketplace Failed the
Children: The Children's Television Act of 1990, 15 SETON HALL LEGIS. 1 345 (1991).
Chairman Wiley, the NAB, and the Association of Independent Broadcast Television
Stations created the time limits on advertising. The FCC also implemented and enforced
the "commercial separation" requirement. See In re Petition of Action for Children's TV
(ACT) for Rulemaking Looking Toward the Elimination of Sponsorship and Commercial
Content in Children's Programming and the Establishment of a Weekly 14-Hour Quota
of Children's TV Programs, Children's Television Report and Policy Statement, 50
F.C.C.2d 1, paras. 49-51 (1974).
31. Television Violence Act of 1988: Hearings on H.R. 3848 Before the Subcomm.
on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong.,
2d Sess. 9 (1988) [hereinafter Hearings on HR. 3848] (statement of Sen. Paul Simon).
32. Id. at 10. But see NAMJUN KANG, A CRmQuE AND SECONDARY ANALYSIS OF
THE NBC STUDY ON TELEvISION AND AGGREssION (1990) (published Ph.D. dissertation,
Syracuse Univ.) (questioning validity of the NBC study).
33. Hearings on H.R. 3848, supra note 31, at 10 (statement of Sen. Paul Simon).
34. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1376 (6th ed.
1990) ("The Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits any interference, by contract, or
combination, or conspiracy, with the ordinary, usual and freely-competitive pricing or
distribution system of the open market in interstate trade.').
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The Television Violence Act exempts from the antitrust laws
certain activities relating to the reduction of violence on televi-
sion. The Act allows the three networks, Fox Broadcasting, the
cable industry, and independent stations to meet regularly for a
period of three years to discuss violence in programming. Before
Congress passed the Act, the Sherman Antitrust Act prohibited the
networks from any joint discussions. Under the Television
Violence Act, the networks receive a three year exemption from
the Sherman Act-but only to develop joint guidelines to reduce
the amount of violent television.36
Significantly, the Act did not grant Congress or the FCC
authority to enforce any guidelines that the networks create.
Supposedly, if the networks do not reduce the amount of violence,
the government will do nothing to enforce the Act. The Act
provides the networks with the opportunity to meet and discuss
this issue; it does not require them to do so. Before Congress
passed the Act, it was difficult for one member of the television
industry to impose internal standards on violence when the others
could gain a commercial advantage by going in the opposite
direction.37 After all, violence is a "surefire ratings booster."38
The Act became law on December 1, 1990. The television
industry, however, did not meet until December 1992, when under
pressure from Senator Simon, ABC, CBS, and NBC finally came
together to establish some guidelines to reduce violent television.
In a joint statement, the networks said that their standards are
intended to "prohibit depicting violence as glamorous or using it
to shock or stimulate the audience."3 9 The standards also limit
violence characterized as "gratuitous" or "excessive" and prohibit
35. Television Violence Act of 1989: Hearings on H.R. 1391 Before the Subcomm.
on Economic and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong.,
1st Sess. 34 (1989) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 1391].
36. Kevin Goldman, A Move to Consider Prime-Time Violence, NEWSDAY, July 4,
1989, at 7.
37. Jason Moody, States News Serv., Aug. 1, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Wires File.
38. Id.
39. Three TV Networks Agree to Standards on Violence, Reuter Libr. Rep., Dec. 11,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
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scenes depicting "excessive gore, pain or physical suffering. 40
They "also limit scenes depicting the use of force that are
inappropriate for home viewing; unique or 'ingenious' methods of
inflicting pain or injury; portrayals of dangerous behavior or
weapons that invite imitation by children; and gratuitous animal
abuse. 41 In children's programs, the agreement also bars "realis-
tic" portrayals of violence that are "unduly frightening." '42
The problems with these guidelines are numerous. First, who
but the networks will apply and interpret the guidelines? More-
over, who will decide what is "gratuitous," "glamorized," or
"excessive"? 3 Further, "violence" has not even been defined. It
is unclear whether the networks drafted the guidelines out of a
sincere desire to reduce the level of violence on TV or merely to
placate Senator Simon, who became disturbed that the networks
had taken no action. Moreover, these standards have not reduced
the amount of violence on television enough to satisfy Congress.
In fact, Senator Simon became so disturbed by the networks'
inaction that in August 1993 he told the television industry that it
had sixty days to reduce the amount of violence on television or
face congressional action.' This differed significantly from
Senator Simon's earlier statements that any guidelines that the
networks develop would be voluntary and unenforceable by the
government.45
B. The Children's Television Act of 1990
The Children's Television Act of 199046 is Congress's latest
effort at improving children's television through regulation. The
1990 Act applies to the content of both children's programming
and advertising during children's television. The Act restricts
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Howard Rosenberg, Conferences Won't End TV Carnage, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1,
1993, at IF.
44. Jennifer L. Stevenson, Sen. Simon Warns TV to Cut Violence, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Aug. 3, 1993, at 3A.
45. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
46. 47 U.S.C. §§ 303a-303b (Supp. III 1991).
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advertising on children's television to twelve minutes per hour
during the week and 10.5 minutes per hour on weekends.47 In
addition, broadcasters must air programs specifically designed to
meet the "educational and informational" needs of the child
audience. Each station must comply with the Act's requirements
in order to qualify for its license renewal.48
In enforcing the Children's Television Act, the FCC assumes
compliance with the educational programming requirement unless
a formal complaint is filed with the agency challenging a station's
compliance. "According to the FCC, it would be too burdensome
for it to monitor compliance on its own."' The FCC's action,
therefore, virtually assured that little change would occur in
children's television.
Each station was to comply with the new children's educa-
tional programming requirements as of October 1991, but there
has been little-if any-noticeable improvement. Networks have
just taken shows such as G.L Joe and The Jetsons and claimed
they are "educational."5 The lack of improvement is due both to
the Act's vague standards, and also to the FCC's lack of visible
interest in enforcing the Act.5"
Despite its initial lack of enforcement, the FCC took action
in March 1993.52 The Commission announced that cartoons like
The Jetsons will no longer count as "educational and information-
al" programming. The FCC also delayed renewing the licenses of
seven stations, demanding that they provide better evidence that
47. 47 U.S.C. § 303a(b) (Supp. HI 1991).
48. Dale Kunkel, Counterpunch: Despite Congress, Children's TV Still Lacking,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1992, at F3. License renewal for television stations is once every
five years. 47 U.S.C. § 307(c) (1988); see also Edmund L. Andrews, Broadcasters, to
Satisfy Law, Define Cartoons as Education, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1992, at Al.
49. Kunkel, supra note 48, at F3.
50. Andrews, supra note 48, at A3.
51. Id.
52. Radio Brdcst. Servs.; Children's TV Programming, Proposed Rule; Notice of
Inquiry, 58 Fed. Reg. 14,367 (1993) [hereinafter Children's TV Programming] (to be
codified at 47 C.F.R. ch. I).
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they are meeting their educational responsibility in children's
programming.53
II. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VIOLENCE ON
TELEVISION AND BEHAVIOR
The average child watches about twenty-seven hours of
television per week.54 In fact many children spend more time in
front of the television than they do in the classroom. It is therefore
reasonable to conclude that television likely has some impact on
a child's learning process. Arnold Fege testified before Congress
in 1988: "[F]or some children, television acts as the electronic
baby-sitter and as a surrogate parent. With a T.V. in 96% of all
American households, T.V. obviously has major effects on the
attitudes, education and behavior of our children."5
Because of the number of children watching large amounts of
television, many people have understandably become concerned
with the amount of violence occurring during each day's pro-
grams. A study released by the University of Pennsylvania's
Annenberg School of Communications in 1990 reported that
prime-time programs average five or six violent acts each hour,
while Saturday morning children's programs average twenty-six
violent acts each hour. 6 The National Coalition on Television
Violence also released a study that showed that 50 percent of
cartoons were found to "glorify violence or use violence to
entertain."57 According to Thomas Radecki, the Coalition's
53. Edmund L. Andrews, Flintstones and Programs Like It Aren't Educational,
F.C.C. Says, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1993, at Al. Unlike the Television Violence Act, the
Children's Television Act itself grants authority to the FCC to enforce the Act's require-
ments. Therefore, while some action is being taken by the Commission to enforce
advertising restrictions and to raise the level of educational and informational
programming, it is questionable whether there will be any effective action taken to
decrease the amount of violence on television.
54. Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 255, 257 (1992).
55. Hearings on H.R. 3848, supra note 31, at 113-14 (statement of Arnold Fege,
National PTA Dir. of Governmental Relations).
56. Marilyn Gardner, Turning Down the Volume on TV Violence, CHRISTIAN Sci.
MoNrro., Feb. 6, 1990, at 18.
57. Sharp Rise in TV Cartoon Violence Cited, BPI Entertainment News Wire, Apr.
1, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
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research director, by age eighteen the average child will have seen
two hundred thousand violent acts on television, including forty
thousand murders.5 8 Moreover, after the 1980s and deregulation,
violent acts increased by about eight acts per hour in children's
television. 9
Despite the reports, the networks have not reduced the
amount of violence on television. At least five possible reasons
may explain why network television executives opt for violent
programming. First, violent programming is "cheaper to produce
than sophisticated drama, and it is far more profitable."6 Second,
"action shows require less talented, less expensive actors than
drama."'6' Third, the networks have found that violent shows sell
much more quickly in foreign markets than drama or comedy.
According to George Gerbner, former Dean of the Annenberg
School of Communications, "Violence travels well in foreign
markets. It is a low-cost, high circulation commodity. '62 Fourth,
violence is also "much easier to depict in cartoons than humor"
because "producers of cartoons rely on an assembly-line approach
to chum out six-to-eight minute episodes, each with standard plots
and characters."6 According to George Gerbner, "[P]roducers
can develop new cartoons merely by using the same plots and
types of characters, but by changing the cast."64 Finally, violent
programming attracts a large audience, and, therefore, advertisers
are more likely to purchase space on such programs.
Because the networks seek profits, they are not eager to
reduce the amount of violence on television. Moreover, the
networks point to the weak link between violence on television
and violence in society. The government, on the other hand, is
58. Peter Plagen et al., Violence In Our Culture, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 1, 1991, at 46,
51.
59. Sunstein, supra note 54, at 284.
60. D'Arcy Jenish et al., Prime-Time Violence; Despite High Ratings for Violent
Shows, Revulsion is Growing Over Bloodshed on TV, MACLEAN'S, Dec. 7, 1992, at 40,
41.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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apparently less concerned with the networks' profits and more
concerned with the possibility that violent television produces a
violent society. The government's action suggests that by
regulating violent television it can reduce the amount of violence
in society. But the government's objective of decreasing violence
in society by reducing violence on television ignores the ultimate
question: Does television reflect society or does society reflect
television? Considering that violence is intertwined with so many
facets of society-sports, newspapers, plays, books, etc.-it
appears that television is just one reflection of a society that has
violent roots that will continue to sprout.
Therefore, when the government makes an effort to reduce
violence, it should consider whether the amount of violence on
television impacts the amount of violence actually committed
against real people. In other words, will any kind of regulation of
television violence achieve the government's objective of reducing
violence in society?
Congress, in addressing this concern, relied on numerous
reports regarding violent television and its impact on society.
These studies show a possibility that violence on television causes
aggressive behavior. Unfortunately, the studies cannot offer more
than a possibility. Because the studies cannot establish a causal
link between violent television and violent behavior, they do not
justify Congress's regulating the content of television. Neverthe-
less, Congress does regulate television violence, relying on four
theories that have emerged from the various studies on television's
effect on viewers.
The first theory is "imitative violence," that is, young viewers
imitate what they see on television. For instance, there was a film
on television about a man committing suicide, and twenty-eight
young men around the nation committed suicide exactly the same
way after seeing it on television.6" Further, convicted felons have
admitted to learning new tricks and improving their criminal
expertise by watching television.66
65. Hearings on HR. 3848, supra note 31, at 10 (statement of Sen. Paul Simon).
66. Albert, supra note 19, at 1304.
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A second theory is the "violence hypothesis." Advocates of
this theory argue that viewing television violence causes aggres-
sion against individuals. One such advocate is Leonard Eron,
research professor emeritus at the University of Illinois at Chicago
and a psychologist at the University of Michigan Institute for
Social Research.67 While a psychologist at the University of
Illinois, Dr. Eron and L. Rowell Huesman, another psychologist,
studied four hundred males for more than twenty years. They
found that children who watched significant amounts of television
violence at the age of eight were more likely to commit violent
crimes or abuse a child or spouse at age thirty.68 A study by
another advocate of this theory, Dr. Brandon Centerwell, a
Washington psychiatrist and epidemiologist, showed that the mere
introduction of television caused a doubling of violent crime as
soon as the first children to watch television were old enough to
commit crimes as adults.69
Dr. Centerwell's study raises an important question: Is it
violence on television that contributes to violence in society, or is
it television itself? Marie Winn, author of The Plug-In Drug:
Television, Children and the Family, wrote in The New York
Times, "[T]he time-consuming act of watching replaces some
crucial child experiences, notably play and socialization."7 She
suggests that it is not violence on television that is the culprit, but
television viewing itself. "Even if the content is monitored, if all
the child watches is Sesame Street, National Geographic specials
or 60 Minutes, the effect is the same."'" And as Florian Sauva-
geau, director of journalism studies at Laval University in Quebec
67. Marc Silver et al., Troubling TVAds, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Feb. 1, 1993,
at 65.
68. Plagen et al., supra note 58, at 51. But see Silver et al., supra note 67, at 65
(stating that the study involved 875 third graders beginning in 1960 and that Dr. Eron
concluded that large doses of television violence make children more likely to act
aggressively and to think of the world as frightening).
69. See Plagen et al., supra note 58, at 51.
70. Marie Winn, Does Television Itself Nurture Violence?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9,
1992, § 4, at 16.
71. James R. Petersen, The Curse of the Boob Tube: TK Socialization and Violence,
PLAYBOY, Dec. 1992, at 49, 49.
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City, points out, "Why is our society so violent? That is the issue
at hand. We're just making television the scapegoat."72
While support for the "violence hypothesis" is substantial, it
is not unanimous. Furthermore, while studies have easily estab-
lished a correlation between television and violence, it is difficult
to establish that television causes violence. Direct government
regulation would almost definitely be unconstitutional unless at
least a substantial link can be established between television and
violence.73
The third theory was formulated by George Gerbner of the
Annenberg School for Communications. Gerbner postulates that
violence on television makes viewers more afraid, less perceptive
of the real world, and more prone to support "repression (more
jails, more executions and more global policing) as long as it can
be justified as enhancing security."'74 Gerbner's report, Violence
Profile, involves the monitoring of samples of prime-time and
weekend daytime television on all major U.S. networks each
year.7' Gerbner does not count violent episodes, but rather plugs
the data into a formula designed to yield comparative measure-
ments (called a "Violence Index") of the violence in overall yearly
programming. In calculating this formula, Gerbner looks at the
percentage of programs containing an occurrence of violence, the
rate of violent episodes per program, the rate of violent episodes
per hour of programs, and the percentage of leading characters
involved in violent acts (either as perpetrators or as victims).76
Gerbner arrives at an index number by examining the frequency
with which violence occurs, of the roles assigned to victims and
72. Paul Gessell, Violence and TV How Clear Is the Link? Commons Committee Is
Just Latest Attempt to Answer That Question, MONTREAL GAZETrE, Feb. 20, 1993, at
E7.
73. See Hearings on H.R. 3848, supra note 31, at 67 (statement of Gene R. Nichol,
Dean, Univ. of Colo. School of Law).
74. George Gerbner, Road Runner Begets Rambo, NEWSDAY, Feb. 26, 1993, at 54.
75. GEORGE GERBNER & NANCY SIGNORIELLI, VIOLENCE PROFILE 1967 THROUGH
1988-89: ENDURiNG PATTERNS (1990).
76. See id.; see also GEORGE GERBNER ET AL., VIOLENCE PROFILE No. 8: TRENDS
IN NETWORK TELEVISION DRAMA AND VIEWER CONCEPTIONS OF SOCIAL REALITY 1967-
1976 (1977); Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 4, at 1160.
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aggressors, and of the relative frequency with which a violent act
results in death.77
While Gerbner is probably the most popular and well-known
of social scientists who engage in this research, he fails to
measure the correlation, if any, between violent behavior in real
life and the frequency of violence on TV.7 8 Consequently, it is
difficult for the government to use Gerbner's Violence Profile as
a justification to regulate violent television.
The final theory offered by social scientists is the idea of
"desensitization." This theory holds that "children become immune
to the horror of [televised] violence, and they become passive
when they see it occur in real life. Because children see violence
so often on television, real life violence doesn't have as much
impact-it can almost be perceived as another television show."'7 9
The problem with all of these theories is that they only show
that televised violence may result in increased aggressiveness,
desensitization, or fear. In order to regulate the content of
television, Congress should be required to show at least a
substantial, if not direct, link between violent television and
violent behavior. While most scientists studying in this field agree
that there may be a relationship between televised violence and
aggressive behavior in children,"0 the scientists have not estab-
lished a causal connection between violence on television and
violence in society. But what these studies all have in common,
however, is that they establish at least a correlation between
television and violence. Consequently, many scholars, social
scientists, and members of the government would like to see the
amount of violence on television reduced. The question is how to
do this without running afoul of the First Amendment. Regulating
77. GERBNER & SIGNORIELLI, supra note 75, at 5; see Krattenmaker & Powe, supra
note 4, at 1159.
78. Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 4, at 1161; see also BARRIE GUNTER,
TELEVISION AND THE FEAR OF CRIME 19-34 (1987) (discussing Gerbner's studies).
79. Hearings on H.R. 3848, supra note 31, at 106 (statement of Frank M. Palumbo,
M.D.); see also GERBNER & SIGNORIELLI, supra note 75.
80. Hearings on H.R. 3848, supra note 31, at 7 (statement of Rep. Dan Glickman
(D-Kan.)).
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the amount of violence on television is, after all, content control,
which the Supreme Court has often found unconstitutional, even
in the area of broadcast media.
Im. AN ANALYSIS OF THE TELEVISION VIOLENCE ACT
The Television Violence Act became law on December 1,
1990; the three-year exemption to the antitrust laws will thus
expire in December 1993. But even in the Act's last year, many
questions remain to be answered. Is the Act government suppres-
sion of speech or a means by which the networks can join together
to reduce what they too believe to be a social ill? Is the Act
necessary, or is the government's goal-to reduce violence in
society by reducing the amount of violence on television-
misdirected? Is the Act effective or are the guidelines merely a
way to appease Congress?
A. Constitutional Concerns of the Television Violence Act
Although the Television Violence Act is.not subject to FCC
enforcement and is merely a limited exemption from the Sherman
Act, it is still a government measure to control the content of
television programming. Even if the Act is not direct coercion, it
is government regulation:
[T]he bill is a velvet glove. Though couched as an invitation to the
industry to do something about violence, it actually is an order. In
form it is an exemption from antitrust laws, giving members of the
industry permission to conspire in a noble cause. Implicitly it is a
threat: Unless a solution satisfactory to Congress is achieved within
three years, sterner legislation will follow."'
Whether or not the Act is a "threat by Big Brother" 2 or merely
something that the networks have hoped for in order to reduce the
amount of violence on television,83 the question still remains
81. Doing Violence Against Violence, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1989, at A16; see also
Stevenson, supra note 44 (reporting Sen. Simon's warning to the television industry that
they had 60 days to reduce the amount of violence on television or face further
congressional action).
82. Goldman, supra note 36, at 110 (statement by Rep. Don Edwards (D-Cal.)).
83. Professor Cass R. Sunstein of the University of Chicago Law School argues that
the Act does not suppress the broadcast industry's speech. Rather, the Act eliminates the
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whether the Act is constitutional. The main arguments for the
Act's constitutionality are that the Act is limited to the broadcast
arena, that any guidelines would be self-imposed and therefore the
Act's provisions do not require or prohibit speech, and that,
although it is content-based, it does not discriminate on the basis
of viewpoint.
1. Standard of Review for the Regulation of Electronic Media
The Supreme Court has "traditionally applied more lenient
standards to government regulation of broadcasting than to
regulation of other media, even when such regulation is based on
content. ' 8 4 Although the Supreme Court has not articulated a
precise standard of review for regulation of electronic media, it
has stated that "because broadcast regulation involves unique
considerations, our cases have not followed precisely the same
approach that we have applied to other media and have never gone
so far as to demand that such regulations serve 'compelling'
governmental interests. '"85
The difference in treatment has been based on two arguments.
First, the broadcast medium is "scarce" and therefore needs
regulation to overcome problems caused by this scarcity.16
Second, broadcasting is a public resource and therefore the
government has the obligation to "set standards to make certain
that the 'resource' is not wasted or misused."87 Although both of
competitive pressures that force broadcasters to produce violent shows even though
broadcasters would prefer not to produce such shows. Because advertisers buy
advertising directly proportionate to the size of the audience a particular program
attracts, a broadcaster would be reluctant to drop a type of programming that attracts
large numbers of viewers unless other broadcasters are willing to do the same. Hearings
on H.R. 1391, supra note 35, at 133.
84. Id. at 161 (statement of Prof. Cass R. Sunstein); see also FCC v. League of
Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Red
Lion Brdcst. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
85. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 378; see also Donald E. Lively, Modern
Media and the First Amendment: Rediscovering Freedom of the Press, 67 WASH. L.
REV. 599 (1992) (discussing government regulation of broadcast media).
86. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. 367; see also Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 4, at
1221.
87. HARVEY L. ZUCKMAN ET AL., MASS COMMUNICATIONS LAW IN A NUTSHELL
377 (3d ed. 1988).
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these reasons pose strong rationales for the Act's constitutionality,
neither is a convincing argument. First, the scarcity argument is
quickly becoming obsolete."8 Today, the number of broadcasting
outlets far exceeds the number of operating daily newspapers,89
which receive more First Amendment protection than electronic
media. In addition, it is questionable whether it is appropriate to
exact a quid pro quo by requiring broadcasters to operate in the
public interest.9"
Because electronic media, especially television and radio,
receive a less stringent level of scrutiny, the regulation must only
be narrowly tailored to serve a substantial (or perhaps only
legitimate) governmental interest.9" The government here has two
strong interests: protecting the nation's children and preventing
physical injury. Because numerous studies have established a
significant link between violent television and aggressive behavior,
voluntary guidelines are "narrowly tailored" and seek "to accom-
plish [the] goal in a distinctly unintrusive fashion."'92
2. First Amendment Scrutiny for Content-Based Regulations
The Supreme Court, in a number of cases, has upheld various
regulations that, although content-based, are not viewpoint-
based.93 The Television Violence Act is similar to these regula-
tions. Although it is a content-based regulation, it is not view-
point-based. Of course, the government could not "enact selective
exemptions from the antitrust laws in order to encourage speech
that it prefers, or discourage speech that it dislikes." 94 For
example, the government could not give an antitrust exemption for
the networks to get together and discuss how to broadcast
88. Lively, supra note 85, at 601.
89. Id. at 599.
90. ZUCKMAN ET AL., supra note 87, at 377.
91. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
92. Hearings on H.R 3848, supra note 31, at 67 (statement of Gene R. Nichol,
Dean, Univ. of Colo. School of Law) (citing League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364).
93. See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (upholding city
ordinance regulating non-obscene pornography).
94. Hearings on H.R 1391, supra note 35, at 166 (statement of Prof. Cass R.
Sunstein).
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Democratic views at the exclusion of Republican views. This
action would be an unconstitutional viewpoint-based regulation. In
contrast, when it enacted the Television Violence Act, the
government did not suppress a particular point of view. The
government is remaining neutral in its regulation of protected
expression.95 The government is not trying to suppress a "social,
political or philosophical message a [broadcaster] intended to
communicate.
"96
"The Supreme Court has never held that content regulation is
subject to a per se ban . . . ."" A court will likely uphold a
content-based regulation as long as the regulation "furthers an
important or substantial government interest; if the governmental
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if
the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is
no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that governmental
interest."98
The Television Violence Act is directed at the "secondary
effects" on the country rather than a point of view.99 In other
words, the Act "is aimed not at the suppression of free expression,
but at the control of messages thought to be harmful because of
the manner in which they are delivered."'' 0 In City of Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, the Court held that a regulation that concentrat-
ed a city's adult movie theaters into a particular area was
constitutional.101 The Court based its holding on the district
court's finding that the City's "predominate concerns" were with
the secondary effects of adult theaters-for example, increased
crime and a deterioration of the quality of life-and not with the
95. Id. at 167.
96. Id. (quoting Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976)).
97. Id. at 166.
98. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
99. Cf City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (upholding
regulation of speech on the grounds that it sought to prevent the "secondary effects" of
the speech-an interest unrelated to the suppression of free expression).
100. Hearings on H.R. 3848, supra note 31, at 66 (statement of Gene R. Nichol,
Dean, Univ. of Colo. School of Law).
101. City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 52.
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content of the adult films themselves. 2 Similarly, the Television
Violence Act's purpose is to reduce the amount of violence in
society, not to suppress certain ideas violent television may
contain.
Content-based regulations that are not designed to censor any
particular viewpoint do not trigger the most exacting First
Amendment scrutiny. The regulation must only be narrowly
tailored to serve an important governmental interest.0 3 Here, the
interests in preventing the public from violence and protecting
children from unwilling exposure are indeed strong. Further,
because the Act does not ban violent television, but merely asks
that the networks reduce the amount they air, a court would likely
find that the Act is the least restrictive means to further the
government's interests. Consequently, a court could find the Act
constitutional under this rationale.
3. The "Pervasiveness" of Television and its Unique
Accessibility to Children
Perhaps the best argument for the Act's constitutionality is
based on the Supreme Court's holding in FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation."~ In Pacifica, the Court, in a 5-4 opinion, "upheld
the power of the FCC to regulate 'adult speech' over the radio air
waves [sic], at least in some limited circumstances."' ' The
speech involved was George Carlin's comedy routine, Seven Dirty
Words. The Court said that although the speech was "indecent,"
it was not "obscene," and therefore deserved some First Amend-
ment protection. However, the Court then turned around and said
that broadcasting receives "the most limited" free speech pro-
tections of all forms of communication because it is "a uniquely
pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans" and "is uniquely
102. Id. at 47 (emphasis in original).
103. Id.; see also United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
104. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
105. JOHN E. NoW~AK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.18, at
983 (4th ed. 1991).
Number 1]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
accessible to children, even those too young to read."' 6 These
factors limited the Carlin broadcast's First Amendment protection.
If Carlin had presented his monologue in a theater rather than on
the radio it presumably would have received greater protec-
tion. 0 7
On its face, the Pacifica holding seems to support Congress's
power to regulate violent television. Television is, after all, a
broadcast medium, and therefore courts accord it less First
Amendment protection. Moreover, many children have almost
unlimited access to a television. Like a radio, the viewer may turn
it on without being aware of the programming to be faced. There
are, however, several factors that may limit the holding of Pacifica
to the radio.
First, radio may be more pervasive than television. Many
people have a television guide and therefore will not turn on the
television unless they know what they want to watch. In addition,
warnings are often placed in television listings and even made on
the air at the beginning of programs and/or during commercial
breaks.0 8 On the other hand, people are constantly turning off
and on the radio without knowledge of the programming content.
When it comes to children, however, a court could easily recog-
nize that either children are too young to read television listings
or would never think to look at them. Therefore, this argument
presumes that parents are present to censor their children's
viewing habits.
Second, while regulations to protect children are understand-
able, the regulations should not abridge other viewers' First
Amendment interests. 9 While the Television Violence Act is
106. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749; see also Hearings on H.R. 1391, supra note 35, at
168 (statement of Prof. Cass R. Sunstein).
107. Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 4, at 1220. Carlin did not perform his routine
on the radio; the radio station played a recording. Id. at 1214 n.526.
108. See id. at 1229.
109. The First Amendment protects the interests not only of the speaker, but also the
audience. See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 77 (1976) (Powell,
J., concurring) ("The central First Amendment concern remains the need to maintain free
access of the public to the expression."); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976) (First Amendment protection
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primarily designed to protect children, the Act abridges the First
Amendment rights of willing adults, the First Amendment rights
of children,' and the constitutional rights of parents to deter-
mine whether their children should be exposed to certain types of
programming."' After Pacifica, however, it is doubtful the
Court would take these factors into account, especially when
considering the substantial link between violence on television and
violent behavior.
Another reason Pacifica may not apply is that the Act is
really only an exemption from an already existing law and not a
newly created law enforceable by the government. Congress is not
directly censoring the material the networks broadcast (although
it may be indirect censorship). On the other hand, the FCC's
actions in Pacifica were much more intrusive on the editorial
discretion of a broadcaster because the FCC made the decision
regarding what can and cannot be broadcast on the radio. The
Television Violence Act allows broadcasters to make this decision.
In this way, a court would likely find that the Act is less offensive
to the First Amendment than in Pacifica and therefore would
apply less scrutiny to the regulation.
Because the courts accord electronic media less First
Amendment protection than other forms of media and because of
the societal interest in protecting both children and the rest of
society from harm, a court will no doubt find the Act constitution-
al. And Congress has already hinted that it may take further action
if the networks do nothing to reduce violence on television.
extends to a communication, its source, and its recipients); Kleindienst v. Manden, 408
U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972).
110. "First, except for material obscene as to minors, children presumptively would
enjoy full First Amendment protection. Second, a state could not justify censoring
materials aimed at children simply because the speech contained 'ideas or images that
a legislative body thinks unsuitable for them."' Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 4, at
1257 (quoting Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 214 n.11 (1975)); see
also id. at 1213-14, 1257.
111. See Erznoznik, 422 U.S. 205. "[B]ecause parents retain a recognized constitution-
al right to direct the rearing of their children, in some cases the minors' First
Amendment rights could be diluted to accommodate the right of parental control."
Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 4, at 1257.
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B. Effectiveness of the Act to Reduce the Amount of Violence on
Television
Judging from the networks' actions so far, it is not clear
whether they will actually reduce the amount of violence on
television. The Act expires in December 1993. The networks
convened for the first time in December 1992 to discuss the
voluntary guidelines, 12 and it was not until June 30, 1993, that
ABC, NBC, CBS, and Fox Broadcasting offered to air warnings
preceding violent shows."' And the networks developed the
parental advisory plan only to avoid a federally imposed system
of ratings for violence on television.1 4 Moreover, critics of the
networks' actions have already pointed out numerous problems
with the networks' plan. First, the networks will decide for
themselves which shows are violent."5 Second, the plan assumes
the presence of parents both to catch the warnings and to switch
the channel. This assumption ignores the millions of children who
watch television without supervision." 6 Third, the advisories
may be "just a faster road map to the violent material."'" 7 In
other words, many children may watch a program simply because
the network issued a warning.' 8 Fourth, many cable and syndi-
cated programs remain exempt.119 Finally, broadcasters could use
112. See News Conference With Senator Paul Simon, Fed. News Serv., Dec. 11, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File (reporting Sen. Simon's announcement
that the three major networks had agreed on joint standards on entertainment violence
on television).
113. Edmund L. Andrews, 4 Networks Agree to Offer Warnings of Violence on TV,
N.Y. TUIMES, June 30, 1993, at Al. Note that no warnings will be aired before cartoons,
athletic events, or news programming.
114. Id.
115. Id.; see also Harry F. Waters et al., Networks Under the Gun, NEWSWEEK, July
12, 1993, at 64.
116. Andrews, supra note 113, at Al.
117. Waters et al., supra note 115, at 65 (statement of Terry Rakolta, founder of
Americans for Responsible Television).
118. The recording industry uses a similar advisory for explicit lyrics, and the
warning has actually prompted children to purchase these recordings. Waters, supra note
115, at 64.
119. Waters et al., supra note 115, at 65. But see Andrews, supra note 113, at AI
(reporting that four days before the Los Angeles Conference on Television Violence in
August 1993, 15 cable channels, including HBO, USA, MTV, and Nickelodeon
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the warning system as a license to air programs that are more
violent than those broadcast before the advent of a warning
system. 2' This development would frustrate the government's
goal of reducing the amount of violence on television.
Because the networks' actions are so recent, viewers may not
have an opportunity to see the results of the warning plan until the
1993 fall season is well under way. At a conference on television
violence in Los Angeles, California, on August 2, 1993, however,
Senator Simon said that the television industry "had sixty days to
start reducing and monitoring violence on television or face
congressional action." 121 Senator Simon has not described what
the "congressional action" would entail.
For an industry supposedly eager to cure a violent society, the
networks have proceeded very slowly. This may be due to the fact
that at the time of the Act's passage, the networks claimed that it
was unnecessary because they had their own standards depart-
ments. If they felt the Act was unnecessary in 1990, who is to say
that they feel differently now? Additionally, because of the market
lure of violent programming, the networks do not have a strong
economic incentive to change their current programming.
If the Act does indeed prove to be ineffective in prompting
the networks to act, how will Congress respond? At one time,
Senator Simon suggested that the government would do nothing.
His recent statements, however, suggest otherwise. 22 There are
a number of alternatives for the government if the broadcast
industry does not reduce the amount of violence on television. The
same questions that were asked about the Television Violence Act
must also be asked with regard to any alternatives: Is the regula-
tion constitutional? Is it effective?
announced that they would join the networks in airing the warnings).
120. Waters et al., supra note 115, at 64.
121. Stevenson, supra note 44, at 3A. At the time this Note was submitted for
publication, the 60 days had not yet expired.
122. See id.
Number 1]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
IV. ALTERNATIVES IF THE NETWORKS FAIL TO REDUCE
VIOLENCE ON TELEVISION
If the Television Violence Act fails to reduce the amount of
violence, it will be largely because the networks are the ones to
apply and interpret the guidelines. They decide what violence is
glamorized, excessive, and/or gratuitous.' Therefore, any
subsequent regulation will probably be a statutorily imposed FCC
regulation. An FCC regulation will require the same scrutiny in a
court that the Act would receive. A court, however, may very well
find a statutorily imposed regulation not to be the least restrictive
means to reduce violent television.'24 Further, although the
Communications Act of 1934 requires the FCC to ensure that
broadcast licensees operate in a manner consistent with the "public
interest,""12 Section 326 of the Act prevents the FCC from using
its powers to censor broadcast media.' 26 But, because of the
limited First Amendment protection electronic media receives, and
because of the strong interest the government has in protecting
children, the manner in which the FCC could regulate television
violence may affect a regulation's constitutionality.
A. Ban Violence Completely
The first alternative, which involves FCC action, is to ban
violence on television completely. This alternative would not only
be unconstitutional, it would be unnecessary to achieve the
government's objective of reducing the amount of violence in
society. The television, after all, is not the only culprit of our
violent society. This nation witnesses acts of violence everywhere.
"Violence is a part of life and has a place in drama. The problem
therefore becomes one of narrowing the use of violence on
television in a manner designed to combat the creation of
increased aggression in the viewer."27
123. Rosenberg, supra note 43, at 10F.
124. Cf. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
125. 47 U.S.C. § 303(g) (1988).
126. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1988).
127. Violence on Television, supra note 1, at 313.
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B. Limit Violence to Certain Times or Days
A more constitutionally acceptable regulation of violent
television would be to limit violence to certain times or days in
the week. For instance, the FCC could remove violent television
from the early evening hours. In light of Pacifica, a court would
most likely find this type of regulation constitutional.
This regulation would, however, face similar problems that a
voluntarily enforced guideline would. The government would be
limiting violent television solely because of its content. "Selective
exclusions from a public forum may not be based on content
alone, and may not be justified by reference to content alone." '128
However, in light of Renton and Pacifica, a court would uphold
zoning violent television for the same reasons the Television
Violence Act could be upheld: the medium is television, Congress
is regulating the "secondary effects," and it has a unique accessi-
bility to children.
Like the Television Violence Act, zoning violent television
abridges the rights of parents and other adults. However, if a court
were to weigh the interests of willing viewers against the govern-
ment's interest in protecting society and its children from harm, a
regulation that would merely limit the amount of violence,
although posing First Amendment problems, would pass constitu-
tional muster.
C. Technical Solutions
A third alternative involves "lock boxes," or other technical
solutions, which provide a potential means of reducing the amount
of violence children see on television. Lock boxes are appealing
because they preserve the rights of both adult viewers and parents,
the group that should exercise the greatest control over their
children's access to the television set. A lock box, or other similar
technical facility, requires attaching a device to the television set
that prevents access to certain programs. The FCC could possibly
128. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
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require the television manufacturer to attach such devices to the
television.
Moreover, the "lock box" rule may be justified on grounds
unrelated to the suppression of expression. Two scholars have
pointed out that lock boxes conserve energy for all owners of
television sets and that pay-television subscribers may save billing
costs from undesired or inadvertent use of the set.129
Two potential problems arise with the possibility of using a
lock box. First, a technical device is unlikely to address the central
concerns of those who believe televised violence is a social ill,
because lock boxes do not guarantee a reduction (or elimination)
of televised violence. Nevertheless, the fact that some members of
society may be offended by television violence is not a permis-
sible basis for censorship of speech. 30
The second potential problem is that parents might be
unwilling or unable to supervise their children's television viewing
even if the means to do so were readily available. For those who
believe televised violence is a social ill, the lock box does not
adequately address the concerns. But for those who believe that
parents should retain the right to supervise the rearing of their
children, a lock box is a good solution. As for the argument that
parents may be unable to supervise their children's television fare,
it may be possible to design lock boxes to "lock out" certain
channels even while a parent is not in the home.
Regardless of the potential problems, technical solutions such
as lock boxes seem to be an effective way to help parents to
control the amount of television their children watch. But these
alternatives are unlikely to have much political appeal because
they will not reduce the amount of violence in television program-
ming, and there is no guarantee that parents will prevent their
children from viewing excessive violence. The current tenor of
Congress seems to be toward action that will reduce the amount
129. Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 4, at 1276.
130. Cf Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
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of violence on television-and reduce it as quickly as possi-
ble.13 1
D. The Marketplace
Because lock boxes do not relieve the anxiety of those who
view violent television as a social ill, and because other statutorily
imposed regulations seem too intrusive, the marketplace may be
the only other alternative. While a market alternative may not
address the concerns of those who believe in complete or partial
regulation, it is the alternative that most effectively addresses the
concerns of viewers. After all, it is the First Amendment rights of
viewers that are paramount. 32 And the viewers have manifested
in the market their enjoyment of violent television and their
willingness to pay for it.
The television industry is part of the marketplace and is likely
to respond to market pressures. Thus, public outcry against certain
programming or a boycott of advertisers that consistently advertise
their products on a particular type of program may be preferable
to Congress acting as arbiter. 133 The television industry will
often receive thousands of letters in response to a certain type of
programming. Shouldn't it be up to the industry to determine
when to remove a particular program?
Even if viewers do not find a program harmful, and therefore
do not respond through the marketplace, the viewers should
control the content of television programming. Control of
television content should not be left to Congress. Today, Congress
wants to control the amount of violence on television. Tomorrow,
131. But see H.R. 2888, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). On August 5, 1993,
Representative Edward . Markey (D-Mass.), chairman of the House Subcommittee on
Telecommunications and Finance of the House Energy and Commerce Committee,
proposed a bill that requires new television sets to have a built-in "V chip" to allow
parents to block the display of programs rated "violent." The Bill would also require
television sets to be capable of blocking programs or time slots even if they do not carry
an advisory. Robert Green, U.S. Bill Introduced to Block Violent TV Shows, Reuters,
Aug. 5, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File. At the time this Note was
submitted for publication, this bill was still pending in the House.
132. Red Lion Brdcst. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389 (1969).
133. Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 4, at 1131 (providing an example of when the
public successfully reduced the amount of violence on television).
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Congress may want to control the amount of drugs shown on
television. The Senate bill that preceded the Act is a perfect
example of how Congress may use antitrust exemptions to regulate
all kinds of controversial subjects. When the Bill passed the
Senate unanimously in 1989, it contained an amendment intro-
duced by Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) that would have included sexual
activity in the Act's coverage. The House version limited the
antitrust exemption to violence. After both versions passed, the
Bill went through a joint conference committee to resolve the
differences, and the committee eventually omitted the "sexual
activity" language. Thus, the Television Violence Act could set the
stage for further censorship.134
Because the purpose of our communication system is to
allow, where possible, the free market to determine matters,'35
television violence should be left to the control of the market.
Moreover, one of the goals of the FCC is to promote diversi-
ty.13 6 This goal focuses on adding voices to provide viewers
with a full range of programming options. Diversity does not
countenance eliminating voices or viewpoints.'37 Therefore,
regulating violent television is in conflict with promotion of
diversity. The market will provide a fair degree of diversity,
especially in a time of numerous outlets. 138
CONCLUSION
Protecting children is a worthy goal, and it is indeed hard to
ignore the substantial social science data that links television with
violence in society. However, one must remember the importance
of the First Amendment. For years, the government has attempted
to impose its values on society by suppressing unpopular ideas.
The Court, usually remaining faithful to the tenets of the First
Amendment, has struck down these various regulatory activities.
134. Doing Violence Against Violence, supra note 81.
135. ZUCKMAN ET AL., supra note 87, at 369.
136. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390.
137. Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 4, at 1274.
138. Sunstein, supra note 54, at 257.
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Pacifica represented an erosion of these First Amendment
principles. Hopefully, this departure will not continue. Even when
regulating the media, one must keep in mind the First Amend-
ment, the values attached to it, and the dangerous suppressive
action it prevents.
While the Television Violence Act appears to fall in line with
a number of Supreme Court cases that allow regulation, the
government must not go too far. If, as predicted, the networks fail
to reduce television violence under the Act, government should
allow television to return to the free market system-its rightful
place.
An antitrust exemption is not the answer either. With an
exemption, the government is basically manipulating the antitrust
laws to bring about government censorship."' The government
should not be able to hand out antitrust exemptions in order to
impose its own values on the television industry. This is a
dangerous activity and not "a sensible way to overcome the
deleterious effects of cutthroat competition.""14
Consequently, although the Television Violence Act may be
constitutional, any further direct regulation of television violence
would violate the First Amendment because it impedes the
freedom of expression long enjoyed by Americans. In December
1993, the Act will expire, and the government should return
television to where it belongs: the marketplace. Congress may then
work to eradicate crime and violence by focusing on the deeply
rooted social conditions that create them. Congress should stop
blaming an electronic box that merely reflects the society that
already exists.
139. See Congress Asserts Its Dominion Over F.C.C., BROADCASTING, Aug. 7, 1989,
at 27, 29.
140. Doing Violence Against Violence, supra note 81, at A16.
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